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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FRANK L. STEW ART, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
ARNOLD LESIN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8491 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a licensed real estate broker doing busi-
ness at Fillmore, Utah. Defendant was a dealer in new 
and used Chrysler and Plymouth cars, operating an 
agency, sales office and repair shop in a building at 
Fillmore, Utah, and desired to sell the building and busi-
ness. 
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On April 22, 1952 a listing agreement designated 
as a "Sales Contract" ( R.3) was executed, authorizing 
plaintiff to sell the building and ground, tools and inven~ 
tory for "approximately $88,000.00." The agreement 
provided that the defendant would pay to plaintiff "5% 
of the above sale price or such other sale price as I may 
agree to accept, immediately a sale or exchange is effect-
ed, .... " 
Plaintiff then endeavored to find a purchaser, con-
tacted prospects and advertised the property. As a re-
sult, he came in contact with Mr. Lorin Peck of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, who expressed an interest in the prop-
erty and business. Mr. Peck was taken to Fillmore, where 
he examined the property and toured the community. 
He there discussed the business generally with both plain-
tiff and defendant and went over the equipment, parts, 
books and records with the defendant, Mr. Lesin. (R. 
19). Several trips were made and the properties inspect-
ed, and finally the general terms of the sale were settled 
by the agreed exchange of certain properties. On or 
about September 18, 1952 the defendant came to Salt 
Lake City with the plaintiff and they met with the pros-
pective purchaser at his home. 
After discussions, the defendant, as seller, and Mr. 
Peck, as buyer, asked the plaintiff to type up a contract 
for the sale or trade of the properties. ( R. 21 and 22). 
This document was then prepared in their presence and 
signed by all three there on September 18, 195 2 as the 
"Contract of Sale or Trade." ( R. 4) . The buyer then 
paid to the defendant, as seller, the sum of $2,000.00. 
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As provided by the Contract, the parties met to-
gether the next day to "complete the transfer of the above 
listed property." Attorneys representing buyer and seller 
were requested to check abstracts and to prepare the 
necessary documents to complete the deal. Mr. Peck, 
at this point, insisted that the defendant guaranty to 
him the Chrysler-Plymouth agency. No guaranty was or 
could be made thereon as the buyer had been previously 
advised by both plaintiff and defendant. ( R. 36, 38, 
and Page 22 of Lesin deposition). 
The buyer and seller never completed the trans-
action and the buyer demanded back his $2000.00 
which was refused by defendant. The buyer, Lorin 
Peck, then sued the defendant, Arnold Lesin, for recov-
ery of the $2000.00 in case #97736 in the District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. The complaint (R. 
85) was answered by defendant ( R. 94), wherein defend-
ant claimed that the agreement of September 18, 1952 
(supra) was binding and that the defendant was ready, 
willing and able to perform and he demanded damages 
in the amount of $3874.40. Trial was had and completed 
and the Court on February 5, 1954 found that the con-
tract executed September 18, 1952 (supra) was partly 
in writing and partly oral and that defendant had breach-
ed his oral promise to obtain a franchise for the sale of 
Chryslers and Plymouths, (R. 110, 111), and judgment 
was entered for return of the $2000.00 deposit. (R. 112). 
Plaintiff is here suing for his commission on the 
transaction on the basis that he has fully performed his 
obligations as a broker when he brought together a will-
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ing seller and a willing buyer and the parties contracted 
for the sale and exchange of properties on September 18, 
1952. 
The defendant did not personally appear at the 
trial to testify but was represented by counsel. His only 
testimony in the record is a part of the deposition which 
he gave in the prior trial between Mr. Peck and the 
defendant. 
The buyer and seller agreed to the valuation of the 
properties that were to be exchanged at $88,000.00. (R. 
81). 
At the conclusion of the present case, the trial court 
announced his conclusion and judgment "that there was 
no sale and that the defendant may have judgment for 
no cause of action.'' (R. 75). Thereafter, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions and Judgment adverse to plaintiff's 
claim to a commission for his services as broker in the 
transaction. ( R. 7 8-80) . 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF FAILED TO SELL THE PROPERTY UPON TERMS ACCEPT-
ED BY THE DEFENDANT. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF FAILED TO OBTAIN A PURCHASER FOR THE PROP-
ERTY WHO WAS READY, ABLE AND WILLING TO PURCHASE 
SAID PROPERTY UPON THE TERMS SET FORTH IN THE LIST-
ING CONTRACT OR UPON ANY OTHER TERMS ACCEPTABLE 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 
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POINT III 
THAT THE QUESTION OF A COMPLETE AGREEMENT FOR 
EXCHANGE OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND 
THE PROSPECTIVE BUYER WAS RES JUDICATA. 
POINT IV 
THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT FOR THE 
SUM OF $4,400.00, BEING 5% OF THE AGREED VALUE OF 
$88,000.00 FOR THE PROPERTIES THAT WERE TO BE EX-
CHANGED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF FAILED TO SELL THE PROPERTY UPON TERMS ACCEPT-
ED BY THE DEFENDANT. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF FAILED TO OBTAIN A PURCHASER FOR THE PROP-
ERTY WHO WAS READY, ABLE AND WILLING TO PURCHASE 
SAID PROPERTY UPON THE TERMS SET FORTH IN THE LIST-
ING CONTRACT OR UPON ANY OTHER TERMS ACCEPTABLE 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 
It is the position of the plaintiff that his duties and 
responsibilities ceased when he had brought together a 
buyer and seller and they had executed their written 
Contract of Sale or Trade ( R. 4) and the buyer paid to 
the seller $2000.00 to bind the transaction. 
The measure of what he must do as a broker to 
earn his commission is found in the written "Sales Con-
tract" (R. 3) wherein it is recited that a 5% commis-
sion shall be paid on the "above sale price or such 
other sale price as I may agree to accept, immediately a 
sale or exchange is effected .... " The buyer and seller 
agreed to exchange properties based upon an agreed 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
sum of $88,000.00 and agreed to meet the next day and 
transfer the listed properties. 
Is the broker to be denied his commission because 
the seller fails to perform the contract he has made with 
the prospective buyer? Such is the effect of the decision 
in this case. The defendant has had two turns in court 
on the same basic question. When the buyer sued to get 
his down payment back, the court found that such must 
be returned because the defendant failed to perform the 
acts upon which the contract of sale was conditioned. (R. 
111 ) Now the defendant has switched positions and to 
get out of paying a commission, he denies that he agreed 
to sell the properties to the said buyer. 
The matter is akin to the situation where a real 
estate broker brings together a prospective buyer and 
seller and an earnest money receipt is executed. Then 
the seller either changes his mind or the title to his prop-
erty is defective so no sale is completed. The broker has 
already earned his commission notwithstanding his client's 
failure to complete the deal and deliver a good market-
able title. 
Cases dealing with the matter have been decided by 
this court generally in favor of the broker. We submit 
that the following decisions are in point: 
Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah (2d) 9, 261 
Pac. (2d) 927. The issues revolved around the real 
estate broker's right to the stated 5% commission on the 
sale of lots. $1000.00 was paid on the execution of the 
earnest money receipt and agreement. That offer of 
purchase was accepted by the owner and the down pay-
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ment was held by the broker. Thereafter negotiations on 
the sale continued until the parties abandoned the deal. 
The trial court denied recovery to the broker but the 
Supreme Court reversed it, and ordered entry of judg-
ment in favor of the broker for the full 5% commission. 
In part, the decision of this Court said : 
"That agreement certainly contemplated that 
the plaintiff would cooperate in good faith toward 
the accomplishments of the purpose for which he 
employed defendant. He cannot be permitted to 
procure them to obtain a buyer, on terms accepted 
by the plaintiff, and then prevent the accomplish-
ment of what he requested and authorized them 
to do by arbitrarily refusing to perform his part 
of the transaction. Under such circumstances, he 
will not be heard to complain of their failure to 
do that which he prevented." 
Soon after the Hoyt decision, this Court handed 
down Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 354, 267 Pac. (2d) 
237 (March 1954). The customary listing agreement 
was executed by defendants in favor of the plaintiff as 
a real estate broker to authorize sale of a motel and pay-
ment of a 5% commission for such services. A purchaser 
was found and an earnest money receipt and agreement 
signed. $5000.00 was on deposit with the broker to bind 
the transaction. The owners consulted their attorney 
and upon finding that the acceptance by purchasers of 
the offer of sale was still conditional, rescinded the con-
tract. Purchasers then came to Utah and unsuccessfully 
endeavored to enforce specific performance by legal pro-
ceedings. In this action for the real estate broker's com-
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miSSion, once again the District Court denied recovery 
but the Supreme Court reversed such decision. The 
opinion provided in part: 
"The proposed purchasers were a~ious. t? buy 
the property even after respondents rescission of 
the earnest money agreement. Their suit for speci-
fic performance is ample proof of that fact. There 
can be no question about their willingness to buy 
and it was stipulated that they had the financial 
ability to consummate the sale. The sale was never 
consummated because respondents changed their 
minds and refused to sell and not because the 
buyers refused to make a binding agreement. Un-
der such circumstances appellants have fulfilled 
their part of the listing agreement by having pro-
duced purchasers who were ready, willing and 
able to buy the listed property and are entitled 
to their commission. Such were the terms of the 
listing agreement made by the parties. There was 
no requirement that a binding contract be entered 
into and for us to add that requirement would be 
to make a new contract for them. This we may 
not do. As stated in 8 Am. Jur. Sec. 184, page 
1097: 
"'Once the broker has procured a person 
who is able, ready and willing to purchase on the 
terms offered by the owner, he is entitled to com-
missions, even though the failure to complete the 
contract is due to the default or refusal of the em-
ployer.' 
"This court in Little and Little v. Fleishman, 
35 Utah 566, on page 568, 101 P. 984, on page 
984, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 1182 indicated it was in 
accord with the above state~ent, even though it 
was unnecessary to a decision of that case since 
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a binding offer had been obtained by the owner, 
by saying: 
"'***The substantial features of the agree-
ment between plaintiffs and the defendant are 
that the plaintiffs were employed to effect, not 
consummate, a sale, and were entitled to a com-
mission in the event of a sale at any price agreed 
upon. When the plaintiff obtained and produced 
a purchaser who was able, ready, and willing to 
purchase for the price, and on the terms proposed 
they did all that was required of them, and the 
owner could not, under the terms of his contract 
with them, arbitrarily refuse to sell and decline to 
enter into negotiations of a sale with the proposed 
purchaser without becoming liable to plaintiffs 
for their commission.***'" 
The defendant absented himself from the trial, ap-
parently realizing that to do otherwise he must contra-
dict the testimony given at the earlier trial between him 
and the buyer. The defense semed to be based upon some 
theory that the plaintiff here, Mr. Stewart, as broker, 
had interposed the condition that the Chrysler-Plymouth 
agency was a part of the deal. However, our plaintiff 
specifically testified that the prospective buyer had been 
taken to Fillmore and advised by him and the defendant 
that the agency could not be sold ( R. 36 & 38). The same 
testimony is found in the defendant's testimony at page 
22 of hi,s deposition. 
Thus the defendant has taken two diametrically op-
posed positions to best further his plan; first to keep the 
down payment on the theory that a complete contract 
had been made with the buyer and now, that no contract 
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has been made so he will not have to pay the commis-
' 
SlOn. 
A broker has no obligation to guarantee the ultimate 
good faith and performance of the parties to the buy 
and sell agreement. Here the buyer and seller dealt with 
each other at arms length. Each was an experienced 
business man. Inspections of properties were made and 
they bargained back and forth. Then these mature men 
made a deal. So no delay would intervene, they insisted 
that the plaintiff, as broker, sit down at the buyer's home 
in their presence and type up the items so agreed upon. 
To bind the sale and exchange, they then read and signed 
the agreement and $2000.00 was paid to the defendant. 
Prior negotiations, questions and representations of 
the parties were merged into their "Contract of Sale or 
Trade" on September 18, 1952. The broker's duties had 
been performed and his commission earned. At this 
stage the broker had brought together two experienced 
businessmen and had produced for his client a buyer 
who was ready, able and willing to complete the trans-
action. Mr. Peck, the prospective buyer, testified that as 
of the date of the agreement, he was worth $100,000.00. 
(R. 64). 
POINT III 
THAT THE QUESTION OF A COMPLETE AGREEMENT FOR 
EXCHANGE OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND 
THE PROSPECTIVE BUYER WAS RES JUDICATA .. 
The basic principle of the rule of res judicata is 
that matters once at issued be set at rest and further that 
parties be not permitted to vascillate between positions 
after a judicial determination. 
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The prior case here involved is Civil No. 97736 be-
tween Lorin Peck, the buyer and Arnold Lesin, the seller. 
The issue was whether or not the $2000.00 earnest 
money should be returned. This revolved around the 
question of whether the plaintiff or the defendant breach-
ed the contract of sale or trade. The same basic contract 
dated September 18, 1952 as signed by the parties was 
in evidence and at issue. 
The District Court in and for Salt Lake County 
through Judge Joseph G. Jeppson tried the case without 
a jury and made the Findings and Judgment (Tr. 110, 
111, 112). These findings included these determinations 
among others: 
"1. On September 18, 1952, plaintiff and 
defendant entered into an agreement, partly oral 
and partly in writing, providing that plaintiff 
would trade to defendant certain property to-
gether with $15,000.00 in cash for a certain busi-
ness of the defendant known as the Lesin Motor 
Company. 
"2. Said promise of plaintiff to pay said 
$15,000.00 and transfer said property to the de-
fendant was conditioned upon the defendant's ob-
taining for the plaintiff the franchise for the sale 
of new Chrysler and Plymouth automobiles at 
Fillmore, Utah, and this condition was known to 
and understood by both plaintiff and defendant. 
"6. Plaintiff fully complied with all the 
terms of said conditional contract, but defendant 
failed, as aforesaid, to perform the acts upon 
which said contract was conditioned." 
By applying the stated findings to our instant case, 
it is obvious that the broker had completed his work; had 
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brought together a willing seller and a willing and able 
buyer, but the seller had then breached the basic condi-
tion of the transaction. 
The cases cited above confirm the broker's right 
to judgment for his commission upon such state of affairs. 
POINT IV 
THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT FOR THE 
SUM OF $4,400.00, BEING 5% OF THE AGREED VALUE OF 
$88,000.00 FOR THE PROPERTIES THAT WERE TO BE EX-
CHANGED. 
The preceding points clearly demonstrate that the 
plaintiff as a licensed broker had earned his commission. 
The amount of the commission was agreed to be 5% of 
such sales price or exchange price as the seller "may agree 
to accept." The exhibits in this case and the testimony 
of the prospective buyer ( R. 65) establish the agreed 
basis of sale and exchange at $88,000.00. The commis-
sion to which plaintiff is entitled is $4400.00 and judg-
ment for such sum should be entered. 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
721 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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